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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study was to look' at the 
relationships between moral philosophy classifications 
and elements of risk^ which in turn affect overall 
decision-making processes. Specifically, two moral 
philosophy classifications were examined: utilitarian and 
egoism. Elements of risk (e.g., perceived risk, and risk 
propensity) were analyzed in association with the moral 
philosophy classifications. It was proposed that 
utilitarians would make decisions,.which were consequence 
driven, and that represented the greater overall good. 
Egoists were predicted to make decisions, which were also 
consequence driven, yet doing so in order to benefit 
their own needs, regardless of a greater purpose. Data 
were collected using a moral philosophy questionnaire 
where participants read scenarios related to. ethical 
situations and categorized themselves as one moral 
philosophy over another. Participants^ risk perception 
and risk propensity ratings were gathered after each 
participant read a risk related scenario. A correlation 
and several univariate statistical analyses were 
conducted to identify significant.differences among the 
groups. In general, the results indicated support for a 
111 
negative relationship between risk perception and risky 
decision-making. Furthermore, outcome history was 
significantly related to participants' risk propensity 
but not related to moral philosophy type. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Moral Philosophy, . 
That which is deemed right and which is wrong is a 
perpetual debate embedded deep within ethical frameworks 
and ultimately individual moral philosophies. Moral 
philosophy is commonly, accepted as the premise for , 
certain behavioral choices made as a result of 
interp eting life's dilemmas. It is believed that 
everyda y circumstances that create ethic.al questions in 
us, as individuals, . are .'dealt, with or resolved- only,.after 
referring to our own moral philosophy.. Consequently,.it 
is likely that personal moral philosophy will.greatly 
infiuence. decision-making. The focus of this, research,is . 
to determine the extent moral philosophy plays in 
decision-making.. 
. Mgral philosophy is defined as an individual's class 
of beliefs, principles, and.ideals regarding, his/her 
behavicr. Identifying an individual's moral philosophy 
type is critical when determining.the basis of ethical 
decision-making (Fraedrich & Ferrell, 19921. Moral 
philoscphies can'.be- viewed as types -or camps' in. which 
individuals base their reasbning for moral decisions 
(Ferrell- & Greshamy, 1985)., I will review both the 
tradition and history of moral philosophy. First, I will 
describe the development of moral philosophy, and then I 
will discuss decision-making. 
Emergence of the Two Moral 
Philosophies 
Moral philosophy is rooted in the early influences 
of the great Greek philosophers such as Socrates and 
Plato. At that time, the belief in striving for, 
materialism'and what may lie in another world was 
considered wasted energy. Each contributed to the idea of 
living a rational and just life. Thus., the field of moral 
philosophy extends back many centuries, yet did not 
produce meaningful arguments over different philosophy 
types until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
During .hat time, David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, and John 
Stuart Mills were in the process of developing,a new 
moral p lilosophy, which would eventually be referred to 
as utilitarianism and ultimately remain.consequence 
driven. Ironically,' Jeremy Bentham.was considered the 
father of what was previously viewed as deontology, which 
was synonymous with all forms of ethics during this 
                
 
period and that, which was rule driven. Utilitarianism 
would eventually become the opposing view of deontology 
(Loudeii, 1994). Bentham's final definition outlines the 
beginning of utilitarianism as it is recognized today. In 
spite of the fact that Hume and Mills contributed to the 
rise of Utilitarianism, .Bentham .was the prime mover in. 
establishing its foundation: and what will later be 
referred to as teleology. 
' i . . . ' ' . 
. . . I Deontology as One Category of 
Moral Philosophy 
Moral philosophy is viewed as an abstract gathering 
of beliefs that is' conveniently-compartmentalized into 
two 'categories: Teleology and Deontology. Deontology Is 
the rnorjal philosophy , category^ which states that rules 
and prolcesses primarily guide one's, decision-making 
b.ehavl.ors Deontology emphasizes "'Intentions or methods 
of a particular behavior rather than the end results'' 
(Fraedrlch &, Ferrell/ 1992, p. ■246) . , In other words, ^ the 
deontologlcal , approach Is more concerned with the means 
rather than the ends In terms of decision-making. 
• . Deontology is, one of two categories In which all '■ 
current moral philosophy literature falls. Although , 
deontol sgy Is one moral philosophy type that encompasses 
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a,portion of the. moral philosophy literature^ it will not 
be thoroughly investigated here since individuals in 
general tend to place greater emphasis on decision 
outcomes rather than decision processes. For/example^ 
managers are typically more, concerned about whether a 
project was completed successfully.as requested rather 
than if it was processed one way. and not another. 
I ^ '/ ' ' 
Emergence of Teleology 
Bentham was a British Empiricist who was primarily 
compell'pd to change the . current legal methods used to, 
handle Criminals. He recommended a system that would deal 
with criminals based on the, level of injury imposed on 
the vicj:im and,.society. Bentham believed the punishment 
or, consequence should match the crime; the punishment 
should not be greater or less than the crime (Beauchamp & 
Bowie^ i979). His views emerged from, hedonistic ideology 
(only that which is pleasurable is good and that which is 
not pleasurable is to be avoided) Pluralistic 
utilitarians (one category of teleology) did not bel.ieve 
that we only seek physical pleasure while attempting to 
avoid pain. Pluralistic utilitarians took the hedonistic 
view a step further by demonstrating that other concerns 
  
such as friendship, courage., knowledge, and health are, 
all internal values worthy'of attention—not simply 
physical pleasure. 
. In the late nineteenth century, a pluralistic 
utilitarian, Frledrlch. Paulsen, wrote a philosophical 
text that outlined a pattern of.beliefs that would,stand 
unchallenged for at least 40 years. Paulsen^s text 
centered on the "'result-based'^ theories of moral 
obligation and duty. .His thrust for a view focusing on 
consequbnce became the field of moral philosophy known as 
teleology (Louden, 19-94). 
Teleology 
As previously mentioned, moral philosophy Is . 
typically divided Into two principal categories. 
Teleology Is the second of two moral philosophies, which 
Is a philosophy categorized as a moral outcome of , 
behavior or a direction toward a goal. Teleology can be 
further divided Into two clas.slflcatlons--utllltarlan. and. 
egoist. In essence, one with a utilitarian'teleologlcal 
philoso will Identify, a situation and make a decision 
for the common good' of.many. The utilitarian believes In 
• 5 
making decisions while considering tKe outcome of that 
decisidn, and its consequences, on the whple. 
Carlson and Kacmar (1997) stated that utilitarianism 
is a doctrine that maintains that what is useful is good 
and.-the determining consideration of right conduct should 
be the usefulness of its consequences. In other words, 
the;consequences should maximize benefits while 
minimizing loss. The second classification of teleology 
is egoism. The,egoist is doing what is best in terms of 
satisfying individual needs. In other words, the egoist 
will typically make decisions for the greatest good for 
him or herself (Ferrell & Gresham, 1995). 
Egoism is,defined,as rightness in terms, ofrthe, , 
consequences for the individual. It postulates , that one. 
should .dhoose actions that result in the maximum amount 
of. good for oneself. The beliefs of the.egoist. can be 
concisely stated, as follows: .^'Do, the act. that.promotes 
the greatest good for oneself" (Rosen 1978, p..38). 
The, disbinction between philosophy .types is not yet. 
clear.enough for the establishment of definitive 
terminology. Researchers continue, to explain teleological,' 
and deontological philosophy, types, in similar and 
contradictory ways using conflicting'terminology. .An 
  
overlap ■exists between the two fields because of this 
confusion in,- terminblogy,. The difficulty lies in the fact 
that both,fields claim support for their positions, which 
merely exacerbates this problem. Thus, since there 
continues to be confusion between .terminologies,, I will; 
state the definitions of moral philosophy and their 
classifications I will use throughout this paper. 
Moral philosophy is clearly agreed to be a 
cbllection of beliefs, values, .and principles that affect 
an individual's path, of behavior. This path of behavior 
is molded by many factors (e.g., the environment and 
social issues, family influences, innate 
■ , ! , ■ ■ ' ; ■ ■ , • , ■ ■ ■ -
pre-dispositions, and peer pressure) . It is understood 
that moral philosophy consists of two primary views. My 
■ I ' . ■ ' ' 
definition of deontology refers to an adherence to a 
belief based on some procedure or mechanism toward some 
end, which leads to, the acceptance of that belief. . In, 
other-words,' the deontologist ."beli-eves all actions should 
be reviewed according to the procedures that define the : 
action. For -example, an individual will determine the 
rightness of a decision made based, on the means used to 
make that determination. Conversely, for the purposes of 
this stpdy, teleology (the moral philosophy category of 
       
interest) refers to an adherence to a belief based on 
some ultimate objective, outcome, or purpose toward some 
end, which - leads.to the acceptance of that belief. In 
other wjords, the teleologist believes actions should be 
reviewe'd, according to their payoff. For example, an 
organiz|ation will likely determine the value of a 
decision made regarding an investment in terms of a new 
process based on the outcome or payoff of that 
investment. Next, the classifications of teleology will 
be defined. 
Classifications are sub-types of moral philosophies. 
These -sub-types consist of components (e.g., 
utilitarianism, egoism, and rule deontology)which 
comprise deontology, and teleology. Although deontology 
i ^ ' . . • 
will not be thoroughly investigated here^ it will be 
included as a.measurement point later on for the sake of 
completeness when presenting the results. Since teleology 
is the moral philosophy 'of interest^ I will define 
utilitarianism and,egoism^ since these are the primary 
classifications that fall under teleology. Utilitarianism 
holds that the outcome or payoff, of a situation 
(decisibn) is critical.when determining the rightness of 
that situation. Additionally, the utilitarian is 
                   
 
            
concerned with the Outcome, or payoff,benefiting .as many 
individuals as possible While egoism also .holds the 
ideal that the.Tightness,of a.situation (decision) is . 
determined by the outcome, the egoist is only concerned,' 
with the outcome in as much as it benefits himor her. 
As noted, definitiohs of moral philosophy have'been 
less thja.n .definitive. So'too, • the measurementiof • moral. 
I . ^ . ' . 
philosqphy will require reserved consideration. Now, I 
will explain the method that will be used to.measure'. ah 
Individual's moral philosophy type and classification. . 
I 'M Moral Philosophy 
rKoh.lberg created av.widely 'known theory of moral ' . 
re.asoni|ng based on levels of one's development. The 
i . , , 
Defining Issues Test (DXT) was developed as a 
multiple-choice test to measure the elements of 
Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning (Rest, 1974). The 
focus here Is on the Moral Content Test (MOT), which was 
.developed for use .with lirtoral philosophy theory. The Moral 
Conterit Test was a:derivative of the DIT. Boyce and 
Jensen (19.78) created the MOT to measure the content of 
moral thought, .it consists of a. sequence of moral. 
dilemmas. The participant reads the dilemma and decides 
                  
        
                     
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the most suitable decision related to the situation's 
morality. 
will use the MCT to assess participants' responses 
to questions regarding philosophy types and to classify 
participants as .either egoists or utilitarians. Jensen 
and Boyce's test is believed to contain every form of 
moral judgement. The first section distinguishes 
teleological characteristics from deontological 
characteristics. Within the teleological view is the 
i . 
. i - . , . . 
distinction between egoism and utilitarianism. The MCT is 
a widely recognized measurement tool that reliably 
separates individuals into the various morai philosophy 
classifications (Wolff & Smithy 1983; Fraedrich & 
Ferrell^ 1992). , 
. ! . • ' ' ' 
A 1981 study by Jensen^ Taylor, and Burton 
investigated whether the eight variabies described in the 
MOT (e.g., non-hedonistic egoism, rule deontology, and 
• I ' ■. . ■ ' ■ ■ ■ 
i , • ■ ■ . 
act utilitarianism) could be compiled into a few factors 
and still be sensitive enough to distinguish the 
variables from each other. In this study, BYU students 
were compared to' loWa. State students using questionnaires 
that identified "how people think about social problems" 
(p. 616) . The construct validity of'.MCT was supported by 
10 
 the results that indicated that BYU scores tended to be 
higher[than Iowa State scores on non-hedonistic and rule 
oriented items., Support for the prediction of. BYU 
students be.ing more non-hedonistic and rule oriented was 
made because BYU teachings are typically influenced by 
spiritual doctrine in addition to regular instruction. 
The MCT showed acceptable reliability. Average 
test-retest reliability was .69 after a one-year 
interval.. In a short-term (four-week) study a test-retest 
reliability coefficient of .75 was attained. , 
Co|nsidering that moral philosophy clearly affects 
all choices We make, it is presumed to also affect our 
decision-making processes. That said, decision-making 
research will be discussed ne,xt since this provides, a 
fouridation Of information inevitably needed to understand 
moral philosophy and decision-making together. 
Decision-Making Research 
The classical decisiori,model is considered the 
founda.tiori 'of research underlying all decision-making in 
behavioral.;'research. The classical model is largely based 
on - economic and. statistical theory, which generally ' 
prescribes and describes decision-making in organizations 
11 
                    
                  
(Edwardsf 1954). The classical,, decision model works on 
the.assumption that decisions are rarely made with any 
uncertainty. According to Beach (1990) classical theory 
alleges to maximize an. outcome through careful .balancing 
of costjs and benefits. This theory attempts to use 
I ' ' ' ' ' 
decision-making as a,catalyst for creating predictable 
changes in an organization. ""Overall, this presents a 
picture of decision-making managers as protectors of 
their organizations^ values and goals rather than as 
relentless seekers of maximum profits'' (p. 2). 
Additioinally, classical theory states that rarely do 
decisions include.several choices simultaneously. 
i . . . ' . 
Typically, one option is reviewed at a time against.the 
present alternative; at this point, a change is made or 
the present alternative is kept. Each decision made is 
considered a component within one large organizational 
agenda,assuming the decision is in the desired direction 
while, at the came time, eliminating chance for failure. 
Not until the late 1950s, and early 1960s did the 
classical'decision model go unchallenged. Some theorist.s 
believed that it.was not descriptive enough nor did it 
provide enough empirical, support for its ciaim.. During 
this time, there were two main alternatives to the 
12 
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classieal theory approach according to the challengers^ 
Firsts It was stated that classical theory be revised 
and/or adjusted such that It becomes a more . useful theory 
(1.e.^ more descriptive) The second option was to 
""reject^^ the classical theory completely and begin
I . , . • 
seeking a new. theory to explain decision-making processes 
(Beach, 1990). 
Several alternative decision-making strategies have 
come inrto view since the classical theory first emerged. 
Unfortunately, most . decision-making theory to date does 
not cle'arly outline exact reasoning behind why certain 
choices! are made. Despite the'fact that they are 
. i , • 
partially unsubstantiated or unfIt"", . Beach (1990) 
. .V i . . , 
conflrmp five alternatives to classical theory that many 
i .■ ■ ■ ■ ■ . ■ ■ ■ 
theorists believe are worthy of attention. The rationale 
for the I'unfltness^j refers, to the fact that these 
theories provide little In the way of support for their 
claims. Although there are five groups mentioned aS' 
alternatives to classical theory^ there appears to be 
greater meaning In reviewing some In more detail than 
others. The five groups ,are as, follows: social processes, 
decisions by objective, mechanical processes, decision' 
typology, and confusion In decisions. The first two 
13 
           
groups iare the primary groups of interest. The first 
group qf theories holds that decision-making is based on 
nothing more than that.of social processes. These social 
, 1 ; .. ^ ; . \ • . • • 
processes will determine the outcome of the 
decision-making procedure (Weick^ 1979). Thus, this group 
associates with,the t.eleologist's view of focusing on the 
outcome of a decision., rather .than the means to which the 
outcome'l was achieved. The second group' of,theories holds 
that thje decision-maker is compelled by the decision 
choices he/she has to choose from and by the ''objective'' 
to be achieved. The impact of social processes on 
decision-making has not been,fully understood. For the ., 
most palrt, individuals .want:to be socially desirable; b. 
they want to portray themselves in a favorable light, 
(Edwards, . 1957). Thus, these social forces greatly affect 
decision-making. The second group is significant because 
it refers .to the choices available and the outcome sought 
by the decision-maker. In this case,, the. outcome may be. 
driving the. intent of the decision-maker,, which may or 
may not be, the best' decision for the greatest number of. 
people. A third group stresses electronic (.computer) and 
mechanical.processes, which view, decisions as "adjustive" 
or "compensatory" efforts that provide limited 
14 
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             
  
information about the specific decision process that 
leads tfo these efforts (Steinhruner, 1974). The fourth 
' ^ 
group "'proposes typologies of different decision 
strategies and the variables that define the typology" 
(Mintzberg, 1976, p. 246). The fifth group emphasizes 
confusion and distraction which surrounds the 
decision-making process and how the attributes of this 
confusion contribute to the success or failure of 
decision-making (Cohen, 1972). . 
I , . 
An0ther alternative to classical theory is image 
theory. This theory proposes that useful components of 
other tpeories^. including classical theory, be expanded 
i , '. 
by highlighting the decision process rather than focusing 
on the social aspects that influence decision-making. 
This theory states that the decision-maker attains three 
specific images that establish the. foundation for an 
individual's.decision, knowledge. The first image 
represents how an individual's morals and ethics outline 
the way a decision should.unfold; the second image, has.to: 
do with the. types of.changes wanted by the decision-maker 
and the: orgapization.while doing.so under time. 
constraints; the third image has to.do with the method of 
accomplishing the set goals the decision-maker has in 
15 
     
mind and tiie probability for. successfully reaching those, 
goals (Beach, 1990). For further understanding of 
decision theory, a construct referred to as "framing" 
needs to be investigated. Framing is an outgrowth of 
image theory, which contributes notably to a greater 
understanding of decision-making. 
Bejach and Mitchell (1987). speak,of framing as a 
useful starting point for decision-making and considered 
- ' ' i ,■ ' ' • ' : - • ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ' . ■ ■
it the iiogicai' ,extension of image theory. Framing 
invoiveiS. a 'portion of the decision^makers.^ principles, ■ 
values,, and goals and the extent to which these qualities 
need to be accessed. MoreoverV the decision-maker.must . 
decide if action is even necessary based on assessment of 
the sit aation 
Ka ineman and Tversky (197 9 ). play a pivotal role in. 
the framing research as they pioneered their prospect 
theory, which includes looking at the framing of 
decisions . as;: a means to ..understanding ways, and the extent 
to. which individuais take risks. Kahneman, and Tversky 
have' coiiectiveiy influenced ail decision-making research 
after their groundbreaking article entitled Prospect 
theory: an analysis of:' decision under, risk. Their article 
incorporated ample quantities; of statistical 
16 
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             
   
manipul|ations in , order to illustrate how decision-making 
is infljuenced by the way a choice is framed regardless, of 
the level of risk. In,other words, one's probability for 
making a particular.choice over another was largely due 
to .the jway an individual views or "frames" a 
decisio|n-making situation. Kahneman and Tversky created 
I . • : . , 
and tested many scenarios (e.g.^ gambling^ disease/ gains 
. losses^ win/lose^ - etc.) in order to validate their 
findings. Next, 1 will briefly discuss one of their 
' i . ' . , , ' . , . 
studies! since .most are.largely recognized by many 
successjiye decision-making researchers., 
. According tO' Tversky and Kahneman (1981), the 
construct referred to as "'decision frame^' is an 
individual's conception of.the acts, outcomes, and 
contingencies associated with a particular choice. 
Tversky and Kahneman stated that an individual's decision 
frame cbuld. change depending upon the individual's 
perceived view of the decision frame.. For, example, one's 
•likelihjood for- making a p,articular 'Choice ..will change 
depending upon how the choices are framed or viewed. 
."Ac ording to Kahneman and Tversky,(1991), 
participants in a study were told to anticipate the 
outbreak of-a.deadly virus that is expected to kill 600 
17 
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people.! Two programs were being developed in order to 
! ^ ' 1 ■/ 
handle the crisis. The, first option in program one was 
framed such that if,implemented^ it would save 200 lives, 
The second :option in program one was presented such that 
there would be,, a . o,ne--third chance that all 600 people 
would' bie saved and . a two-thirds chance that no one would 
be savejd. Seventy-two percent .chose option one. 
Individuals' .remain risk averse when decision options are ' 
framed, such that the gains are perceived to be too worthy 
of risk|ing. The first option in program two was framed 
such thlat 4 00 people will. die... The second option in 
i ■ ■ ■ . 
■ I ■
program! two was pres.ented such that there would be a 
one-thi|rd chance that no one would die and a two-thirds 
chance that all .600 people would die. Seventy-eight. 
percent'chose, option two.in this. case. Individuals. 
continue to remain.risk, seekinq when decision frames are 
perceived such that ah- alternative•to a negative outcome , 
isi.equivaient. 
i ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
. The 'bottom line^ with respect to the study above^ is 
that .iridividuals .prefer not to make risky decisions.when 
the decisions are framed as choices between types of 
gains. . jOne gain is perceived to be too significant to 
.i -■■ ■ ■ ' i ' ■ . ' ■ ■ ' . ■ . ' ■ ■ ' ' ■
risk. Llikewise, individuals prefer to take a risk when 
■isV 
decisicns are. framed, as choices between types of losses, 
Taking a risk in this situation is acceptable since not 
taking the . risk ;is pefceived to result in a significant 
loss regardless. Additional findings in terms of 
decisicn-making research will- be discussed briefly in the 
next few paragraphs .. 
A number of processes have been found to•contribute 
to ;Organizational decision-making. More specifically/ 
Nutt„,(1993) elaborated on.the effective and less than 
effective formulation processes practiced within 
organizations today.- The formulation process is a 
procedure^ car.ried but.by a responsible agent (a manager) 
that., begins by responding to the claims, made by key 
people and ends when,an. option or options have been 
targeted for.■development. In essence^, the decision-maker 
takes a ..course of action in response to a number of , 
claims by influential people then.evaluates and selects 
the best route , for improvement. Nutt (1993) assembled 
four,, main procedural decision types referred to as 
formulation processes in his research. The first process 
is /^ idea'^ formulation.. Critical features of this process 
include forming an. idea; then the problems are linked to 
the idea prior■to. any .decision beipg made. Ironically, 
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this pxocess is used more' than any other, yet 
demonstrates the least amount of effectiveness. The 
second process ds "issue" formulation Critical features 
includej discovering issues and attempting to find, 
soluticjns. Managers typically attempt to reach an 
effectiive solution through some form of unstructured 
• I • ' ^ . ' . • . .. . 
analysijs.. This process is used more than other effective 
I . ' . 
processles, but not as often as idea formulation. The 
third pjrocess is "objective-directed" formulation. With 
this ppocess, a manager will clearly outline their 
objectijves and use their objectives to direct a course 
for decision-making actions. This process is used about 
as often as issue formulation. Finally, process four is 
the "refraining" process. With this.formulation of 
organizjational decision-making, managers will illustrate 
their needs by developing new,and creative standards for 
defining,existing and future problems even before 
analysis is considered. This process, is surprisingly used 
least often,: yet provides managers with the most 
effective , results. The , last two processes, demonstrate the 
most effective forms of managerial decision-making in 
organizations according to Nutt (1993). 
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To further effective'decision-making in . , 
organizations, managers must do more than simply base 
' h i" - . ' ' " ' . . 
decision-making on trite ^'ideas'' or issues'^ , that lack 
effective problem analysis. Managers will benefit greatly 
by outlining'^objectives'^ toward specific targets which 
lead to| better decisions and also to guide them in 
defininig problems creatively before conducting analysis 
as demonstrated by the ''reframing" process. 
Clearly1 there;are multiple factors influencing. 
I . . , 
decision-making The classical model provides, a good 
startinjg point, yet falls short due to lack of empirical 
supporti. Other theories, also, provide, useful information 
for dedision-makers. Undoubtedly, many contextual factors 
(e..g., environment, social processes, organizational 
demands, etc),, including ones the decision-maker brings 
to the situation, will affect the outcome and" 
effective.ness of the decision. , , 
. ,j,. ' :,Decision-ma,king.'typically., consl.sts. of two main 
components ;(Zakay, 1984a, ,1984b). First,, "'it is 
contingent.on the characteristics of the specific 
decision problem.,., as well as on the way it is perceived 
by the decision-maker" ' (Zakay,. 1984a, p.. 207,).. In 
addition,, individuals have : the ability to implement 
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multiplje deGision-making strategies while doing so under 
differeint circumstances (Einhorn, 1970; Svenson, 197.9) 1 
It is dvldentythat multiple factors influence . 
declsldn-maklng.and decision strategy. Knowing that 
.declslo|h-maklng Is Influenced,by multiple factors only ; 
makes ijt more difficult to uncover.the . exact reasons , why 
declslolns are made, The Influence of.moral phllpsophy on. 
.decision-making will, be reviewed next. . 
Moral Philosophy and 
Decision-Making 
, .Research 
. . I 
W1.th what. Is known thus far about philosophy types,, 
it. -Is Ijlkely that decisions made by. the egoist will more 
than,likely be accounted .for. by a self-serving bias,. The 
egoist Is likely,..-baaed on. current research, to act on 
hls.,or..her behalf' and to do so regardless of the 
. consequerices to others. The,^egolst Is clearly .a- " 
self-centered self-serving Individual who Is.■going to 
make decisions only to satisfy ..personal needs 
disregarding the .audience or level of perceived risk, In 
Contrast., the utilitarian recognizes the value of an . . 
outcome as long as. the outcome benefits the greater good 
without Inferest of personal gain. 
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Outcome History 
Ma|rketing research continues to show how 
decisidn-making processes based on, moral philosophies 
relate jto outcomes andgcdnsequences of those decisions. 
Organizatiohal, as" well: as indiyidual, characteristics 
need .to; be .accounted, for. when determining whether a 
decisidn was, made correctly.or not. According to Sitkin 
and Pabjlo (■ 19'92) , a variable capable of affecting risk 
propens|ity is "outcome' history" . . Outcome, history is the ■ 
belief ian. individual holds . re.garding' a decision made; in a 
previogis, situation and the . outcome of . that decision' ■ 
■ i ■ . ■ . ' . ■■ 
lsucGes|sful or ■unsuccessful) ;. In other' word's, previously 
. i ' ' ■ . , ■ ■ , . '' ■ ' ■' ' , ' . ■ : ' ' ■ 
' succ'ess|ful decisions can dictate , the likelihood ; 
'(propenlsity) that a decision-maker will make a type of 
. 1 ' ■ ' ■ ■ ' . ■ ■ ■■ ■ ■ , ■ 
decision in the future. Therefore, the utilitarian, in 
this case, 'will likely make-a decision- that .represents 
the needs and interests of an.organization. The 
Utilitarian has been positively shaped by consequences of 
making the "correct" decision in previous situations. 
.However, if the utilitarian, has not endured negative 
consequences or punishment for a poor decision, then it 
is not. jclear whether this individual will actually make 
the correct decision when potential risk is low. 
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Likewise, the egoist has his/her own agenda set oh 
tending to personal needs. The egoist is not as. 
interested in the - ramifi.cations, of decision,consequences 
as the utilitarian is. Most egoist decision-making 
processes are not linked to any form of. consequences 
(Bettman, 1973). . 
1 . Risk 
, Rilsk is operationalized as .a situation (decision) .. . 
that ihvolves uncertainty of the ,outcome. When a decision 
is madej with uncertainty, a gamble is made. Furthermore, . 
with uncertainty comes the probability for loss and 
wagerihg the cdsts of making a certain decision against 
the benefits of making that decision. Thus, high-risk can 
be percleived as, making an investment in something which 
. . . ' • . . • . 
has a high probability for: loss (e.g., a manager hiring: 
an emplbyee who is clearly not qualified over one who is 
■regardl|ess: ,of rationale) . In this case, the manager may 
be taking a risk: of being terminated, .ostracized by , 
co-workers., or losing self-esteem because family and/or 
friends learn about the incident. Low-risk can be 
perceivjed, as making an investment with, little chance for 
loss (e|.g. ,, a manager who hires the. mOst qualified 
2 4 
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applicant). Jackson and Dutton (1988) confirmed that most 
forms of xisk 'include one or more of the following:", 
unexpected outcomes in terms of decision-making, goals -
which- are more difficult to achieve than normal .and a 
potential range of outcomes, which are less certain. 
Teleology and Risk./ 
Schlenker and Forsyth (1977) describe, teleology as a 
judgment of a moral action that is dependent upon the 
consequences of that action. Schlenker and Forsyth also , 
found that teleologists would make different moral 
judgments depending upon the situation they are in. One , 
study c:onducted by Schlenker and Forsyth found that 
undergiraduate students, categorized as, utilitarian,: were 
likely|to make different decision-making processes , 
dependent upon the risk in the situation: (e.g., 
potentially high or low risk situation). Their study 
demonsttrated clearly that a utilitarian individual will 
tend to take, fewer risks when the chance for loss is 
high ., 
When examining decision-making and moral philosophy 
research, it becomes apparent that the two subject 
matters are deeply meshed within each other. As 
25 
  
  
 
 
demonstrated; by Qsborn and Hunt (1974) and Ferrel and . 
Greshanj (1985) . decision-making tends .to. consist of many 
factors .(.e.g multipie dimensions, processes, and 
contingencies)... Ferrel and Gr.esham (1985) show how 
personail characterist.i.cs and busine.ss characteristics., 
affect jdecision-making either directly or indirectly. 
Subjectjs basing,their decisions oh previous knowledge, ' 
beliefd, and val.ues' confirm this finding by how they 
interadt with other, individuals when confronted with a 
diiemma. . ; ; ' ; 
.Mdny managers refer to their decisions as being 
ethically based. These ethical actions are inseparable , 
from one's moral philosophy as the premise for ethics is.^ 
founded in one's moral philosophy type. Sherwin (1983) 
further investigated and discovered two points of 
interest: First.> .-he found that decisions are .iirmly 
integrated in;business ethics; second, a company's 
ability to reach ^ performance objectives", is directly 
related;'to the type,of decisions made. The understanding 
one:can draw' from this research, is that if the action.s 
of an organization's'department'are' successful (e.g., 
astute I personnel' selections);,: then many groups of 
individuals may;benefit, such as.:' ■"employees, management, 
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. stockhcjiiders^ ,c society" (Sherwin, 1983, 
p. 89)4 Clearly, maintaining an ethical environment,can 
prove to be useful for businesses, which is demonstrated,
V I . , 
by the ifact that greater profits are attainable for all 
groups I (e.g., employees, consumers, and society) affected 
by a cQmpany's "ethical" environment. 
Aistudy conducted by Roldan (1988) examined the 
value :cj>,f ,effective' decision-making. It was mentioned that 
to generate accurate judgements of others is necessary, . 
but not .sufficient, tor a manager to be considered an , 
ethical' individual.:' Furthermore, Roldan believes - that an 
ethical:decision is .driven" by an individual's conscience, 
which 'is-"simply' an" inner feeling of -satisfaction ' or 
guilt over an action done:or not done" (p. 27). That 
said, bhe .conscience might play a larger role in 
dehermining whether the best decision will be made. This. 
leads us to-the notion- of what truly establishes one's -
-conscience. In this;-case', moral philosophy- type may play 
a large- role -.-in determining decision outcome'. Therefore, 
we are .directed back to the outcome or consequence as 
that- which drives:,an individual to make a certain 
decision.- AGCording to Roldan, a manager must demonstrate 
that decisions were made ethically in order to establish 
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credibility -in others for.doing W'h is right. The 
probleni lies in the fact that a manager's conscience may 
not coijrespond to the correct decision. Moral, philosophy 
arid pefceived; social risk are constructs not typically 
investigated: simultahebusly.' According to Ferrell and 
Gres.hani (l^BS.)' and;Rettig ,(1966) "almost no .research has 
measured the impact of risk .on an ethical decision . 
related to an individual's moral philosophy" (p. 283). 
Thus,' the next topic of interest, social risk, will be 
examined to more- fully/define it. 
i Risk and■Decision-Making 
. . :The,construct of risk has: attracted the interest cf 
researchers in the business environment for many years. ■: 
Specifically, marketing researchers have had a strong 
interest in understandihg perceived risk and how it 
relates to consumer decision-making (Bauer, I960) .: Risk 
is defined as "measurable uncertainty" and can be 
operationalized,by the probability of losing some "thing" 
(MacCrimmon, 1986) . As illustrated by Bowman- (1982) risk 
reflectis the "uncertainty" that is present before one 
engages .:in a decision. Risk surrounds any form of 
decisidn-making regardless if the outcome is the one: 
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 desirecj;. According to.Haunschild, Davis-Blake, and 
Fichmah (1994),risk comes in all sizes. For'example, 
acquisition decisions; can be very daunting on the -
decision-maker■and the organization ■regardless of the 
outcome,. In 'this, case, there can be a high level of risk 
associated with the decision because of high corporate 
visibility, exposed personal■values, .and,how the decision-
will affect others. 
■ Certainly',, risk can never be 'completely eliminated 
when making decisions. Because society is ever changing, 
individuals are going;to perceive the context of each 
situation differently than another similar situation. . 
This perceived risk may cause individuals to apply a 
greater or, lesser.amount of value to a decision that 
needs to be made. Additionally, we can postulate that 
levels of risk are going to, affect.individual types of 
decisions. Decision-makers are going to place a, weight on 
a particular decision to be made and proceed- to make that 
decision. At . this., time, it is believed that for ,a . 
utilitari.an. the amount of weighted risk is likely to, 
vary. . At. the, same timef the egoist is not likely to vary 
his .werghting of a decision because heOr, she is concerned 
about doing what, is right or best for himself. 
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Although , the marketing lite'rature has' provided many . 
definitions of■-perceived' risk,, several main risk 
components continue,.:to 'be researched, 'MacCrimmon (i98"6) 
•cr'eate'd- three components- of .risk':- 1) the', magnitude of 
loss, 2) fhe chance of loss, and 3) the exposure to ' loss:. 
Out of these components came?the contributions by Jacoby 
and Kaplan,,\w identified six different forms of .risk: 
financial, performance, physical, psychological, social, 
and the overall measure of .risk. Although the research by 
Jacoby and Kaplan does not necessarily claim to provide 
knowledge for organizations to. alter an individual's 
philosophy, or value system, it. does however support the 
notion that psychological and social risk are related to 
moral.philosophy. In addition, it was discovered that the 
risk components an organization may realistically control 
are the financial and,social risks (Jacoby , & Kaplan, 
198 6): 
Financial and ..social' risk can be respectively 
defined as quantitatively measured risk (.e.g., dollars: 
and supjectively measured, risk (e .g ,., an individual' s . 
feelinps) . Although types of risk are considered, . 
independent' of' -each other, research also includes- a type 
referred to as "overall" risk. This research will not 
3'0 
 emphasize the,.financial or overall risk, but rather 
proceeJl, with a deeper understandihg of ^ the perceived 
socialirisks that exist for individuals,within 
organizations.; 
. Interpretation of others' evaluations of us can 
significantly affect levels of decision-making. According, 
to Frafedrich and ,.,Eerrell (1992) the negative evaluation 
by others (e.g., peers or,superiors) can drastically 
alter kn individual's method.of future decision-making. 
If othkrs have .a negative interpretation .about a 
situation or the context in which a decision is. made,: it 
is likply that we will adjust the way.our future 
decisiion-making procedures take place. For example, if a 
manager makes an obviously risky selection decision and a 
peer discovers the poor selection decision (e.g., 
high-risk situatidn), the manager is .possibly risking the 
lo.ss 'of self-esteem, credibility, or friendship. In 
additijon the risk of being alienated or ostracized due . to 
a poof decision is enough to.keep many decision-makers 
'from deviating from the situational norms. For- example. 
It is expected that the;utilitarian,would■definitely make 
an 'accurafe decision in the high risk situation for fear, 
.of 16s|ing.what can easily be, taken for granted, (e.g. , ' 
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friendkhip, companionship, or trust). At the same time, 
it is less clear what .the same utilitarian would do in 
the satoe, low risk, situation. 
. ; . Research .conducted by Sitkin and Weingart (1.995) has 
demonstrated that not only are there direct effects 
related to .decision-making behavior, but mediating 
effectk that contribute as well to the understanding of 
decisipn-making behavior. In addition to risk perception, 
risk propensity has been identified.to determine if it 
had any significant relation, to.decision-making processes 
(thesel terms will be discussed in the next paragraph). 
Decisipn rfsk can be viewed.as a construct used to 
crassilfy alternatives the decision-maker is confronted - . 
with. IFurthermore;, to the extent arp'decision involves 
high u|ncertainty, whether in terms of th.e choice among 
alterniati'veS .or in terms of totalgindividual 
alternatives,-the..decision is considered risky" (Sitkin & 
Pablo.,. 1992/ p. 219). . .. 
i Measurement of Risk ' 
I Perception and Risk 
Propensity . . . 
E^isk perception and risk propensity are considered 
I' ' - . . . -
two colmponents of decision risk. Risk perception is 
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definejd as : an indiyidual.'s determination , of \a risky 
situatiion in terins of tte probability of outcome and 
confidtence in the type of perceived outcome. Risk^ 
.percepition ;can be' assessed by a four-item scale_ developed 
by MadCrimmon and.Wehrung (1985) to measure 'the amount of 
risk rielat-ed to the decision to be made (alpha ■= .75);. ' ' ' 
bisk plrdpensity; is"defined as an individual's inciinatioh 
to avo'id. or . take risks. ' Propensity has proven- to change 
over tiime; therefore, it (can be interpreted as a 
develdpmental:' 'p-rc'cess the decision-maker engages in . 
(Bairdl & Thbmnsvtl'PB5:) . Gontrasting literature states-
.that pjropehSity-is ■ a -solid and consistently definable 
.attribute (-Wolman, ' 1993( . 'Sitkin and- Weingart attempt to 
integr|ateiboth= philosophies to make the point that , 
individuals will adhere to decisions based on many 
factors (e •■■g-. , ; current situation or individuals irivolved)-
whiie jother times decisdons may deviate from expected 
norms (e • g • / ndt hiring the most, .qualified applicant for 
a job)^- hiak. propensity is assessed: by a five-item scale 
creatdd for risks, related to business decisions 
(alphi = .86) ,: .' 
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I . Hypothesis i • ' - , 
Ailthough the research linking - social, risk and' moral 
philosophy types or classifications is minimal'at best, 
Rettigl and Rawson'(1963); Fraedrich : and ; Ferrel (1992) ' 
found jthat, risk was considered critiGally related to . 
'one's- Iparticipation in ethical or unethical behavior-, 
(i.e-.,i'risk is associated with the ethicality of a-
situatiion),,. A positive evaluation,from others was viewed 
to be iimportaht to' utilitarians, providing the outcome of 
his orj her decision still affected the greater good. 
Partigipants' risk in this study included the possibility 
of losing credibility or being perceived in a negative 
way from their peers due to: the participant's decision 
"" - - I . . . ' , • . . - ' 
type. - 1 -
Ejerrel and Gresham (1995) fqund that an egoist, like 
1 " • ' . ' 
the ut|ilitarian, would make decisions in terms of the 
. 1 - • ' 
consequences of that decision, rather than any rule or 
procesls that would guide his or her decision. However, 
the egoist:.adhered to making decisions while keeping in 
mind -tihe best interest of himself or herself. This 
demonetra-tes support, for the notion that level of risk 
may ndt necessarily influence the egoist compared to what 
is gained in terms of the outcome; again, this 
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self-gaining interest is the'driver', for the egoist 
regardless of risk. ; , . 
A|. Therefore, it.; .-is hypothesized that the 
utilitarian/will be less; likely to engage in a 
risky decision in a, perceived high risk ; 
situation than in a perceived low risk 
situation.' 1 ; 
B. Regardless of risk, an egoist will make a more 
risky decision than the utilitarian. 
. Hypothesis 2 
lyjoral, philosophy is a fundamental set of standards, , 
belief|s;> ^ and processes connected to our decision-making , 
.behaviiors. There are few criteria for : the egoist to 
determine the rightness of a decision except for what the 
egoist! believes to be right. The measure for what is ; 
assumed:right is referenced, to the egoist's behavior 
(Schle|nker &Forsyth, 197:7). By knowing an individual's 
moral philosophy classification, one should be better 
able to predict a,decision outcome of that individual• In 
other Iwords, knowing whether a/person is an egoist or 
utilitarian will provide some insight as, to the type of , 
decisions they might make.- Many factors which can 
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infludnce social;:-ri'Sk perceived outcomes, peer 
acceptance/rejection, etc.) are virtually limitless. Some 
research demonstrates how individuals vary their 
percepition . of social risk and their likelihood for making, 
a,decision based)oh how the options are viewed or framed 
(Kahnelman & Tversky . 1979). v 
' ' ihaf . said, since moral philosophy tends to be more 
stabld,compared to levels of perceived risk, it is 
hypothesized that.moral, philosophy will be a better 
predidtor of outcome than social risk. 
I ' : , Hypothesis 3 
' dutcome , history is the:belief an individual holds 
regarding the e.xtenf to which a previous decision or 
situation has lead to a successful or uhsuccessful 
outcoiiie. Sitkin and Pablo's study (1992) suggests that 
•risk E|rop,ensity.:influ'ences future decision-making as 
■determined,.by outcome' history. ' Specifically, as an 
■individual acq.uires more s'uccessful decision outcomes, . 
' the individual's•risk propensity .increases. Likewise, if 
a'h. individual acquires more' unsuccessful decision . . . 
outcomes, the individual' s risk propensity decreases.' 
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T|;herefore,, it is hypothesized that. a successful 
i i . . ; . ' \ , 
outcome history will increase risk propensity and an 
unsucdessful,outcpme history will decrease risk 
j , / ^ 
properisity for - making.decisions.t 
I ■Hypothesis 4 - ■ 
to Sitkin and Weingart (1995) , an' 
indivijdual is more, likely to avoid a perceived high, risk 
situation than a perceived low risk situation because the 
,fhreati of losing something is greater in the, high risk 
situation. Furthermore, Sitkin and Weingart postulated a 
negatiive relationship between high levels of perceived 
risk and risky decisions because most individuals.link 
risk with negative. outcQmes. 
'Therefore, it is hypothesized that risky 
decisron-making behaviors will be- negatively associated 
with levels of perceived risk. 
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CHAPTER TWO- : H 
' C 'METHOD- C'. ^ 
. ' Partieipa'nts 
Data were col-Iected 'by, sa'mpling .one,hundred an'-d . 
- thipty"^nine c-o'llege - students , froiti California State -
University, San Bernardino and San-Bernardino Valley -
Co.llegd... Parti.cipants .were treated according to Ethical : ^ 
Principles - of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (American 
Psychological Association, . •'1992)-. 
I ' -.Design and Procedure. . -
AI combination of wit.hln and between subjects -
unlvariate statis-tics were used One ANCOVA and one 
.correlationai analysis were also' oonducted. -
- P ihstruc.t.ed toj read three,) 
vignettes, which correspond to moral philosophy types,. 
and ,in<|iicate. whether they were.likely to perform a 
speGific act (e.g., ethical or non-ethical decision). 
■ple.xt partiglP'ahts,,: read .a listing) o several different 
philosophy , type,.sland .chose .one that closely accOun-ted for 
the, tyOe ; of, de-cisions they, just made. This concept is 
hased On the. d,dea that „most ,individuals fall- withiri a few 
different philosophy- types with: an,.'emphasis, that clearly 
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i ' ' ' . . . . • , ' -
defines them as either a utilitarian or egoist philosophy 
type (Jensen, 1981). The Moral Content Test (MCT) was 
developed Specifically to classify an individual's 
decision into different moral■■ philosophy classifications. 
■ ■Participants were then .asked to read the risky- . 
decisipn-making scenario based on Brittian and Sitkin.-
After;the scenario was read, ■ participants answered 
questions pertaining to the risk related questionnaires 
(e.g., decision-making behavior, risk perception, and 
risk propensity) , ; 
Aidemographic profile.was gathered to identify any 
potential differehces among participants in 
decision-making. No statistically significant differences 
were discovered in the outcome variables with respect to 
gender,| ethnicity, age, or school status (see Appendix 
■ i ■ . ' ■ ' - • ■ 
B) ' . ' I ■ • , ■ .■ . ;. , ■ ■ :■ ■ ' ■ • ■ ■ ■ . .- .■ ■■ ■ ■ „ ■ ■ .. ■ ■ ■ 
Measures ' ■ , 
An extension of the Brittian and Sitkin (1989) 
Carter racing scenario was developed. Their scenario was 
effective in determining how participants would respond 
to different risk situations with-respect to a racing : 
scenario. According to Sitkin and Weingart (1995) this 
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scenario' is considered to be "highly realistic" and 
"quickly engaging." To more closely align this study with 
the practical application of the risk scenario, a 
parallel form of the race scenario, was used. This 
parallel decision-making scenario was. created, piloted, 
and implemented in this study. It was,used as the primary 
risk scenario based on the Brittain and .Sitkin race 
scenario. The parallel scenario puts the decision-maker 
in a risky. Situation such that he orshe must decide to 
engage;or not engage a consulting team in a project. This 
project may provide an abundance of financial stability 
and cohtinuous work; at the same time, it may prove to be 
corporate suicide depending on the perception of the risk 
involved. The piloted parallel scenario was created to be 
more closely aligned with a specific risk scenario within 
an organization. This type of decision involves personal 
risk, business risk, and physical risk. Risk was 
described as follows:. "If you decide to .engage the team, 
you ma|y lose the respect of friends, relatives, 
associates, and endure physical harm because of your 
i " ' , • . 
. I ■- ■ ■ . ■ • ; 
response" Sitkin & Weingart, 1995, p. 180). . A scaled item 
questionnaire will be used to measure responses . (see 
Appendix^ D) . 
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OUtcpme history ;was using two different 
conditions (see Appendices E & I). Within, the scenario/ 
the .,uniu,ccessful history was.indicated by a, lack of 
succesh in previous .risky decision-making behaviors. The 
.successful history was indicated, within the scenario by . 
the success of previous.risky decision-making, behaviors. 
Participants indicated their likelihood for. engaging the 
consulting,team using a percentage between 0 and 100. The 
higher I the:percentage applied af ter reading the .outcome 
scenario^, the greater, the'.participants^ likelihood for 
engaging the team.; 
Two elements were used to categorize participants, 
into moral philosophy type. First, a self-administered, 
questionnaire consisting of three vignettes was given to 
the participants.. Vignettes of, this, type . of context tend 
to provide better quality.data-from the participants . 
rather [than .common questions (Alexander & Becker, 1978) ,. 
Two diff.erent business type .scenarios and one r 
non-business , scena'rio were, administered. In addition,. as 
detailed in APPENDIX C, the.dMCT was administered which • 
.asks,participants to identify the re.asons for their, 
decisions'in the'vignettes (Boyce & Jensen, 1978). 
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As noted in Appendix F, a four-item scale was 
created by MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1985) and used to 
gauge EsartiGipants' risk perception. This scale 
determined thetlevel;df perceiyed risk associated with 
the decision made' based on; Whether one would engage or 
not engage the team in the project. The alpha for the, 
items in this scale was .75-.. 
As noted in Appendix ,Gy the five item scale was 
created by Sitkin and Weingart (1995). and used to 
identiiy participants' propensity to engage or not engage 
the team knowing- the risk- involved in their choice. The 
reported alpha for the- items in this scale is .86. 
As noted' in Appendix H, a manipulation check of 
participants, was' used to' confirm that subjects responded 
in the I direction anticipated based on the outcome history 
(Sitkip & Weingart, 1995). 
j: Results 
Exploratory analyses were conducted before testing 
the hypotheses.: The data were screened for normality, 
outliers, and data entry.errors. Normality was checked 
using tinivariate..statistics to verify that all of the 
scalesj conformed-:to the normal curve. The perceived risk 
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 and risk propensity variables were normally distributed. 
The prdbability to- engage the team variable was , 
significantly, skewed,for-the first administration (See 
Table 1)1 Two' outliers were revealed after running 
bo.x-plots on'the,data. These outliers were significant 
departures .from normality'■( z = 2.95 p <. .001) and 
therefdre removed from' the data set. 
Eich participant received two . scenarios., one in. -
which' an individual' had been successful in prior projects 
and one scenario in: .which an individual had been , 
uhsuccessful. The- order of these- scenarios was 
counterbalanced., so that approximately one-half of the 
^ ■ i ■ ■ . ' ' ■ ' ■ ■ . ' . - . ■ . ■ . ' ' . 
participants received the unsuccessful .scenario first; 
the other half received the successful.scenario first. 
After dach scenario, participants were asked to respond 
to a, number of' question's-. The following table provides a 
brief gummary of the probability of engaging the team 
variable by scenario and order of presentation. . . 
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Table „1. 
Descri||tives. for Probability of. Engaging Team 1 
, I ; , N Mean ' SD'' '' Skew, . i'. . 
1®^ Scenario Admin. 
. Unsuccessful Scenario- . 71' 70.7 22.4 . -1.11-* 
Successful Scenario , . 71 7'9..0 : .25'.-5 -.1.56* ;• 
. 2""^. Scenario Admin. 
Successful Scenario .:63 75.2 19.2. -1.24-
Unsiiccessful Scenario . .63 55.0 32.3 -0.17 
Ndte.* z significant at p < 0.001 
Participants did not show significant differences in 
the ratings they applied after reading the first 
scenario. In other words, the difference in ratings for . 
the unsuccessful [M = 70.7, Sd = 22.4] and successful 
. . . I , ' 
[M - 75.2, Sd = 25.5] scenarios was not statistically 
. I' . , ' . ' ' 
significant. Therefore, greater meaning is evident by 
reviewing the significant differences in scenarios.that 
were . readi second. . participants' scores differed 
rema.rkabiy.,.:.mOre so/ after reading the seco.nd. scenario. 
When tfee successful scenario was read second,.M =79.0 
Sd = 3/O and when the unsuccessful scenario was read 
second; M= 55.0 Sd = 3.3.,The first administration did . 
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not differ by :success. but did for the second- - ;' 
adminidtration The. manipulation eheck, ddd in fact 
provide support for. the nQtion that participahts/ . 
likeliliiood for. making a particular decision was 
influenced by previQus successful or unsuccessful 
de.cisipns during the. 2"'^ administration scenario. Because 
there was:no discernable difference between responses to 
the key variable,^ probability of. engagement: of\team for 
the first scenario, the remainder of the analyses will be 
based on.the participants' responses to the second 
scenarip.. Descr.iptives and freguencies were computed 
next. The tables below illustrate the, means, standard 
deviatidns, perGentages :(as needed) of variables to be 
used in. the subsequent analyses. , . 
- '.Table 2. 
Frequencies and Percentages for Moral Philosophy 
Classifications 
I - -- h ':N- Percentages 
. .Egojist: : '33 • . , 24.% 
tftilitarian- . 27 . - 20% ^ 
'He-dlohiStic Otilitarian : -46' 33% 
- beolntoTogy 1 22- 16% 
Se-l|ected- more than one , 11 7% -
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Ejieven participants placed themselves in more than 
one moial philosophy classification. Therefore, those 
participants' data were not included in the subsequent 
analyses. The majority of participants fell in the 
Hedonistic Utilitarian moral philosophy classification 
(33%).iDeontology, represented the least populated 
classiiication with (16%) of the participants falling 
into that group. The Egoists and Utilitarians represented 
24% and 20% of the population respectively. 
Table 3. 
Descriptives for Total Perceived Risk 
2"^i Scenario N Mean SO 
Administration 
Sudcessful Scenario 61 15.1 6.95' 
Unsuccessful Scenario 70 11.-9 4.39 
participants.evaluated the perceived risk variables 
using a scale of 1 to 7. The following represents the 
type' and direction of scale anchors used in the risk-
pefcep|tion,scale: : 1 = -positive situation to 7 = negative 
.situat|ion. The scale includes four variables, which were 
summed ;to achieve a total perceived risk- score. Two 
variables were recbded prior to calculating the total 
score.:.The items of the scale are located in Appendix F. 
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Iri terms of the risk propensity scale, participants 
responded to each item using a dichotomous rating scale 
to determine their risk prbpensity. The following 
repre'sdhts .the type of.ahehors used for the variables 
within I the risk propensity scale: 1 .= "choose more risky 
alternatives.based on the assessment of others on whom 
you muit rely" to .2 = "choose less risky alternatives 
based dn the assessment-ofv others on whom you must rely" 
The scale.includes five variables, which, were summed to 
achievd a total risk propensity score. The actual scale 
is located in .Appendix^ G. The overall combined mean of 
the scale- , was . 7 .'46, Sd = 1.24. 
. . . i - Tests - ot Hypotheses-
• The general linear model -was used to determine the 
degreeito which moral philosophies and components of risk 
influe^tce decision-making. All hypotheses were,examined 
using Analysis of variance design (including within and 
between,subjects design), ANGOVA, and.correlations to 
determine whether support for the hypotheses exists. 
Hypotheses la stated that.a utilitarian would be 
more likely to avoid risk seeking behaviors when levels 
Of perceived risk are high compared to low. The 
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utilitarian classification was compared with the 
remaining classifications for. both high and low risk 
(i.e., I successful/unsuccessful scenario)to test this 
hypothesis. There was no interaction between, utilitarians 
and all other moral philosophy classifications 
F (1, 118) ,= .8.09, p =.482.,- Therefore., hypothesis la.' .was 
not supported However, the second administration ' 
indicated the potential for significance between the 
utilit.arian classification and the remaining 
classifications as demonstrated in.Table' 4.. .. 
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Table 4. 
Probability of Engaging Team by Moral Philosophy 
Classification - 2"*^ Scenario Administration 
N Mean SD 
Success 
Egoist 14 80.29 21.85 
Utilitarian. 17 31.5.6 
Hedonistic Utilitarian 21 67.62 29.25 
Debntologist 74.00 30.07 
Unsuccessful 
Egbist 14. 65.71 •20.98 
Utilitarian 17 50.13 20.44 
Hedonistic Utilitarian 21 48.14 26.21 
Depntologist 7 49.29 22.14 
Table 4 indicated greater differences between the 
egbisticlassification compared to the remaining. , 
■classiiieations., , yet the utilitarian classification ■ 
showed I ;the griatest V; difference in means from the . 
successful; ?s.ce'nario; and the unsuccessful scenario., Bas.ed 
on the I trend within the unsuccessful scenario, the ef fect 
size whs reported .(t) = . 021) . 
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Moral- philosophy research' supports, the .notion;that 
egoists tendtovmake decisions that will benefit 
themselves regardless Of whether or not other.s. will 
benefill. Additionally, levels . of risk tend hot to 
influehce egoists as, much as the degree to which -they 
feel.'ttiey could ultimately benefit from the, decision , 
(Fraedlich & Ferrel> ' 1992) Hypothesis: lb .maintained .that 
an egoist would make a more risky decision than a. 
utilitarian would regardless „of, risk level. A between 
subjects ANOVA, design was-performed to discover if .the 
two groups were significantly different. Ratings 
indicated non-significant, differences between,egoists and 
utilitarians, F (1, 59)1 =1.07, p = .306. .Therefore, 
hypothesis lb was not supported. Although, the hypothesis 
was hot , supported,, the . extent . to, which the groups differ 
in Scores from the successful scenario to the 
unsuccessful scenario was in .the-direction predicted ' (see 
Table 'Si. ' \ , i ■. , ; -
5 0 
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Table 5. i 
Descriptives for 2"^ Soenario Administration 
N Mean SD 
Successful Scenario 
Egbist 14 81.58 21.85 
Utilitarian 16 79.5,0 20.44 . 
Unsuccessful Scenario 
Egoist 14 65.71 20.98 
Utilitarian 16 50.13 20.44 
Risk research argues that decision outcomes tend to 
indicate how extreme the range of potential outcomes can 
be. Individuals tend to over emphasize extreme outcomes 
when the chance for loss or gain is great (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). Moral philosophy is comprised of one's 
values) standards, and beliefs, which are qualities that 
tend to remain stable over time (Barry, 1979). Hypothesis 
2 states .that perceived risk will differ by moral 
■philosophy A between subjects ANCOVA design was 
conduc-ted to evaluate perceived risk for .the 2"*^ -Scenario 
.Administration,' Ratings indicated, non-significant 
differences, F' - ,(3, 121) -.828,,- p = .481. Therefore, 
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hypothesis 2 was not supported. Table 6 below provides a 
brief summary. 
Table ^ , 
Deserlptlves for Moral Phllosbphy and Perceived Risk 
^ N , Mean, , SE 
2nd Scenario Admin. 
Egcplst 32 68.84 , 5.15 
Utilitarian 23 53.34 4.80 
Hedonistic Utilitarian 45 58.79 4.19 
Depntologlst 21 59.50 7.08 
■Risk propensity research claims that an Individual's 
succesls ■ or lack of ■ success . In making decisions will 
greatly. Influence future decision-making (Sltkln & Pablo, 
1992) .rHypothesis 3 stated that risk propensity would be 
contingent upon the level of previous, outcome success In 
declslbn-maklng. "A one-way between subjects ANOVA was 
• i ■' ' . , . . ' ■ : . ■ 
computed to discover the effects of outcome history on 
risk propensity. As previously stated,, outcome history Is 
operationallzed as the extent to which one has been 
succesisful ,"or unsuccessful In prior decision-making 
behavljors. Ratings Indicated significant differences, for 
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:)ndithe 2 I Scenario" Administration, ,F ( 1, 130) = 8 .44, 
p = :OpA r\=: .312. Table 73 below provides a. brief summary. 
Table V. 33 ■ 
Descri;^tive's for Risk. Propensity and Outcome History 
■ 3 , ■ ' N ■■ Mean ■■ ■ SD 
Risk Propensity . 
' Unsnccessful; Outcome History 02 ; , ■ ' 7 .18 1. 2 I' 
■ ■Sucdessful ■Outcome History ; 59 O -BG - 1.20 
■ Hypothesis -4 ■ stated that 'an inverse relationship 
would pxis.t between levels ■•of perceived risk and risky 
decisibn-making behaviors. Specifically, risky 
decision-making behaviors would be negatively associated 
with ijevels of. perceived risk. Correlations were-
conducted to determine the strength and direction of 
these |two variables. The results did indicate a strong 
■ - ■ j ' ■ . ■ ■ 3. , .3 ' ■ . k ' : 
negati|ve correlatidn between total perceived, level of 
risk a|nd the,probability of making a risky decision 
-..767, 1 p^ <3^ .01. h. . ■ ■ ■ ■ . ; i; : . ;3 
. 3 Discussion . ■ 
T;his thesis study, examined the relationship between 
moral philosophy classifications and components of risk 
rel.ati|ve to decision-^making behaviors. Moral philosophy 
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is effectively linked to one's reasoning for making a-
particular decision. Moral- philosophy is closely aligned 
with the study of ethics or one's standard of behavior-, as 
it is the foundation in determining right and wrong. An 
individual's own moral philosophy can be interpreted as a 
compilation of values: acquired through the learning 
process and situational variables (Fraedrich,.1993). 
Clearly, risk has. the potential to include many 
unknowh outcomes with respect to decision-making. No 
decision can be made without some degree of risk or . 
potential for loss. Risk research states that individuals 
are influenced,by the interpretation of how risky a 
decisibn may be. Kahneman and Tversky (1979), discovered, 
that.individuals tend to practice risk averse behaviors 
when there is great potential for loss. On the other 
hand, |subsequent, research claims that prior success in 
decisiion-making will increase the probability that one 
will ebgage in; risky decision-making behaviors in the 
future) (Pablo, Sitkin, & Jemison, 199:6). 
A framework in which moral philosophy 
classifications and risk components were developed to 
investigate, influences oh current decision-making 
proceases. - Furthermore, Utilitarian and 'E.goist moral 
- .:. 5.4 . . . . . - s .- : 
philospphy classifications were examined in conjunction 
with one's risk perception and risk propensityi : . 
Several analyses were performed to explore .potential 
differ!ences among classifications and risk components. 
.Specifically,' a combination of within and between subject 
analys|es of variance designs were computed; additionally, 
one ANiCOVA was . computed to .investigate the relationship . 
betweein moral philosophy and perceived risk decision 
outcoiries; and finally, a correlation provided data on the 
relationship between risk perception and risky decision 
making behaviors. The next section discusses the results 
of the analyses. 
Overall, results provided mixed findings. 
Participants falling within the Utilitarian 
classification did not demonstrate a likelihood toward 
risk avoidance behaviors in situations where high levels 
of perceived risk, were present. However, lack of support 
for hypothesis la may be influenced by the size of the 
sample,. The number of participants.-within the Egoist and 
jUtilitarian classification for the ■2"'^ Scenario 
Administration was' relatively ; small. When ' the means, were 
plotted,..- ;the Utilitarians .did in fact demonstrate the 
greatest■likelihood for avoiding risk behaviors when 
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perceived risk was highv^ A analyzing the data,, one 
could' speculate that there might be a learning effect 
present between the, first and second scenarios for both 
countelrbalanced groups. Participants did not indicate. 
signiflicant differences after.responding to the first , 
scenario regardless if the first scenario was successful 
or unsiuccessful. Again, the manipulation check supported 
the aslsumption that individuals are influenced by the 
order 'of a successful or unsuccessful previous outcome. 
, . Schlenker and Forsyth (1977) conciuded the following 
regarding egoists, "no moral standards can be considered 
.valid except those in reference to one's own behavior" 
..(p. ,331). From this, one might conclude that an, egoist's -
decision will likely be made with the intent that he/she 
will ,b|enefit,, , in some capacity, from that decision 
I . . , , ^ ' ' . ' 
1, " ' i ^ ^ 
■regardless of whether others will- benefit. Also, egoists , 
are mqre ■ likely : to change their decisions regardless■of 
external influences (e.g., level of risk)/than any other ■ 
classification'according, to Fraedrich■and Ferrel (1992) . 
Similar to hypothes-is la, :,it- is believed that hypothesis 
-lb wag not stati'sticdlly significant primarily due to 
samplb size. As scenarios were' counterbalanced and 
. analysed according to egoist and utilitarian 
■ -i-" ■ ■ - '56 ■ ■ 
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classifications, the number of participants dropped 
considerably. However, when the means were plotted, 
egoistis 'did -in fact demonstrate a greater likelihood for 
making; a risky rdecision compared to utilitarians. Similar 
to. hypothesis la one could speculate that there might be 
' ' . 
a'learning effect,present between the first and. second 
scenarios for bot.h counterbalanced groups. Egoists and 
Utilitiarians did not indicate significant differences^ 
after ;responding to the.first scenario regardless if the 
first Iscenario was successful or unsuccessful. However, 
there iwas a noticeable difference,in the groups,after 
responding to the second scenario. 
Mbral philosophy tends to be based on an 
indiviidual's beliefs, values, and standards. It is 
"believied that moral philosophy, ns a system of values 
which jguides one,'s conduct, is deeply embedded within us; 
it is,Icapable of remaining fairly stable over time 
(Barry,, 1979). At the same time, levels of risk can va.ry 
dependiing upon the individual's perception of the risk 
involved. , March, and Shapira, (1987) stated that most 
indiviiduals will see identical risk situations in 
entirely different ways. Although moral philosophy tends 
to be :a more stable variable than risk, hypothesis 2, 
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which blaimed that moral philosophy would be a better 
predictor of outcome than perceived risk was not 
supported..The size of the sample may have played a role 
in affleeting the'statistical power of discovering 
•significance between moral philosophy and perceived risk. 
The egbist:classification demonstrated the possibility 
that it could predict outcome better than.perceived risk, 
when compared to the remaining classifications. The 
.learning,effect -may be present in.this hypothesis as well 
since Only the 2-^ Scenario Administration shows trends 
for potential.significance. . 
Two main■components of risk in this study include 
risk perception and risk propensity. Propensity is still 
gaining interest within current risk research. Propensity 
asserts that previous performance involving a task, 
situation, or "decision" will greatly affect future 
tasks, ! situations, or "decisions". In other words, 
previous decision Outcomes become the driver of future 
.decision-making behaviors. Individuals; are clearly 
influenced by the history of success or failure of 
previous decisions (Pablo, Sitkin, & Jemison, . 1996) . 
Hypothesis 3 was supported as the results were 
statistically significant. Results revealed that risk 
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propenisity .was- contingent upon;the-, level of-, previous 
outcomje' success in decision-making. Research.conducted by 
Sitkini and.Pablo (1992)' supports this discovery. In- their 
study,! they discovered support for individuals taking 
more rjisks due to previously successful outcomes. . 
.Additiionally, 'individuals were reluctant to take risks 
when-ipire-vious outcome histories were unsuccessful. 
Ailthough risk perception and decision-making 
reseafch tend to run contrary to the foundations of 
"prospiect theory", there are consistencies between the. 
negatiiVe corre.la.tions discovered in hypothesis 4 of this 
study,: and the work performed by Kahneman and Tversky. As 
noted iearlier,. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) stated that 
individuals tend to be risk averse when the chance for 
loss is high regardless of previous success. Hypothesis 4 
was supported by the data. High, levels of perceived risk 
were alssociated with less risky decisibn-making 
behaviidrsw ' ' ' ' - -
Summary 
The decision-making research in relation to moral 
I . - . ' - " 1 ' ' - : 
philosiophy and social risk is still burgeoning. The 
variabjles that are capable of influencing decision-making 
59 
 behavilors 
a
r
e
 
virtually 
u
nlimited. 
S
e
v
e
r
al 
c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
s
 
of 
m
o
r
a
l
 Iphiloeophy 
w
e
r
e
;
 identified 
a
nd 
t
e
s
t
ed. 
T
h
e
s
e
 
c
o
m
p
o
nlents, 
r
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
 
t
o
 
a
s
 
c
l
a
s
sifications (e.g.
,
 
.
 
u
tilitiarianismiand 
e
g
o
i
s
m)
,
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
d
 
s
o
m
e
 
u
n
d
e
r
s
t
a
n
d
i
n
g
 
-
a
s
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
e
s
s
e
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
w
h
a
t
 
m
o
r
a
l
 
p
h
i
l
o
s
o
p
h
y
 
s
t
a
n
d
s
 
f
o
x
.
 
A
t
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
t
i
m
e
,
 
r
i
s
k
 
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
a
 
f
o
u
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
u
n
d
e
r
s
t
a
n
d
i
n
g
,
 in 
a
d
dition 
t
o
 
m
o
r
a
l
 
p
h
i
l
o
s
o
p
h
y
,
 
t
h
a
t
 
m
a
y
 
s
h
e
d
 
s
o
m
e
 
l
i
g
h
t
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
riables, 
w
hich 
influence, 
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
-
m
a
k
i
n
g
 
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
s
.
 
I
n
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
u
l
a
r
,
 
t
h
i
s
 
s
t
u
d
y
 
lookeci 
a
t
 
r
i
s
k
 
p
e
r
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
r
i
s
k
 
p
r
o
p
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
a
s
 
, 
c
o
mponjents 
t.hat 
heavily influence 
o
n
e
'
s
 interpretation 
'
 
a
n
d
 
l
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d
 
f
o
r
 
m
a
k
i
n
g
 
a
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
.
 
, 
, 
L
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
S
t
u
d
y
 
.
 
O
n
e
 
l
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
,
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
u
d
y
 
w
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
i
z
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
.
 
A
 
s
l
i
g
h
t
l
y
 
l
a
r
g
e
r
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
size 
m
a
y
 
h
a
v
e
 
, i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
d
 
■the 
p
o
w
e
r, andv -p
ro
v
id
e
d
 
s
tro
n
g
e
r 
s
u
p
p
o
rt 
fo
r 
m
any 
o
f 
th
e
 
h
yp
o
th
e
se
s. 'A
d
d
itio
n
a
lly
, 
th
e
'sa
m
p
le
 co
n
siste
d
 o
f 
u
n
i.Y
ffs
ity
-
stu
d
e
n
ts 
o
n
ly
,, w
h
ich
 m
ay have p
la
y
e
d
 a 
ro
le
 in
 
h
in
d
e
rlin
g
 
t.he 
ro
b
u
stn
e
ss 
o
f 
th
e
 
s
tu
d
y
. 
A
lth
o
u
g
h
 m
ost 
■
"re
s
e
a
rc
h
e
rs
 
te
n
d
 
to
 .s
e
le
c
t 
fro
m
 
a 
re
a
d
y-m
a
d
e
 
s.'tu
d
e
n
t 
■
p
o
p
u
ld
tio
n
, 
a
d
d
itio
n
a
l re
se
a
rch
 m
ay "b
e
n
e
fit
,
f rom
 
■ in
c
lu
d
in
g
 em
ployees-.in
, a . n
o
n
-u
n
iv
e
rs
ity
 
s
e
ttin
g
.' 
■ 
;60-
. :■ 
     
 
ftnoth;,#r- iimitation was not incorporating additional 
moral iphilosophy sub-classifications. Research states 
that individuals/primarily fall within either the 
Teleoiogi.cal or Deontoiogical moral philosophy category. 
There are variations of these classifications that might 
explain why.individuals make the types of decision they 
make. I 
: ,A.third limitation of the study may- be linked .:to , the 
idea that the. participants had difficulty understanding 
the cpntent .and the measures uSed to assess..one's ratings 
on thp variables. The:student sample may not have 
-acquiied the experience necessary to respond in the most 
effectxive . method.- It was determined that a learning trend 
or effect was -present in this study from- the 1®^ scenario 
administration and the scenario administration.: ; 
A firial -limitation- of this study indicated that -
participants might not, "in fact, have perceived enough 
risk in the- parallel risk scenario. If participants did 
. not perceive an extensive amount of risk, it is unlikely 
that they -would apply appropriate ratings that would 
provi.de meaningful results. 
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APPENDIX A 
INFORMED CONSENT FOR 
THE STUDY 
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.INFORMED CONSENT FOE THE STUDY- ' V -
l.You '.are Deing asked to participate;in ^ a study that 
is designed to measure" factors, that affect decision 
making. This study- is being ' conducted ' by John V. -Wood 
under-the supervision of Dr. Janet Kottke, Professor of 
Psychology. "This study has -been approved by the- . 
PsychOTogy Department Human Subjects Review Board, 
Calif-prnia fState- Univefsity, San Bernardino. This study . 
isinino way harmful.to your.emotional health. , 
; 1 am .awalenof-the following conditions 
. I A. . demographic:' 1 will read and Complete a-
j . questionnaire y 
I B-. I will read a s.cen.ario related to risk and 
. ! complete the corresponding questionnaire 
rC. I will read a scenario about my previous 
j outcomes related to decision.making 
I will read a listing of different moral 
Ir philosophy types.and choose the one that most 
I - ,.closely fits me 
All information,that you provide will be held in 
eonfl|dence by- the resedrcHers. At no time will your name 
be reported with your responses. All data will be 
reporited in group form only. 
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.. Your participation in this study is completely 
voluntary. You may choose to withdraw from this study at 
any time without penalty. Any additional questions about 
this study should be directed to John V. Wood 
(909)1371-2308 or Dr. Janet Kottke (909) 880-5585.. If you 
i , ' 
have dny questions about research subjects' rights 
contacbt the University's Institutional Review Board 
(909) j 880-5027. By placing a check mark in the space 
below) I acknowledge that I have been informed.of, and 
understand, the nature and purpose of this study. I 
freely consent to participate. I also acknowledge that I 
am atileast.18 years of age. 
Placeja check mark here: Today's date: 
i do appreciate your voluntary participation, 
howevdr you will have the right to withdraw from 
i . • -
participating to the research any time. If you have any 
I • ' • 
questions regarding the research, you can contact Dr. Jan 
Kottke at . (909) 880-5585.. Thank you very, much for your 
cooperation., .. 
By placing a check mark in.the space below I 
acknowledge that I have been informed of, and understand, 
the ndture and purpose of this study. I freely Consent to 
participate. 
I,agree to participate • ^ Date - . 
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,DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
Gender; 
Male Female Age: 
School Status 
Freshman Sophomore Junior 
Senior Grad Student 
Ethnicity: 
Asian African American 
Caucasian Hispanic 
Native American Other 
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 MORAL PHILOSOPHY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please read the following situations and respond to 
the question asked after each situation. 
Situation 1 
Sherry Smith has recently accepted a job with a 
young aggressive retail company. Smith's former retail 
employer is rumored to have developed a confidential 
in-house software package that is easily used by 
managers. When Sherry was hired she was led to believe 
her selection was based upon her management potential. On 
the morning of her third week. Smith received the 
following memo from her superior: "Please meet with me 
tomorrow for the purpose of discussing your former 
employer's software package." 
If you were Smith, what are the chances you would 
provide your new employer with the software? 
Likely Unlikely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Situation 2 
Allan Bartels did some odd jobs for neighbors (i.e., 
painting, building sheds and garages, etc.) and was paid 
substantial sums of money. Allan knows that these monies 
go unreported. At tax time, Allan considers his options 
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of reporting, the extra■income or not. He knows that the 
IRS will never find out about the extra income. 
If you were Bartels, what are the chances you would 
report the extra income? 
Likely Unlikely 
■ ■ ■ ' ,1 2 ,3 , 4 ■ ■ 5 6 . . 7 
Situation 3 . . 
Ed Johnson is in charge of market development for 
Rollfast Company. In the past, the company has been 
barred from entering a market, in a large Asian country by 
collusive efforts of the local retail corporations. 
Rollfast could expect to net 550 million dollars per year 
from sales if it Could penetrate this market. Last week a 
businessperson from the country in question contracted Ed 
and stated that entry into this market could be had for 
an "under-the-table payment of $50,000. 
If you, were,Ed Johnson, how likely is it that you 
would ipay. the rnoney? 
Likely Unlikely 
■ . i . ■ . • • . ■ . ' ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
1 ■ 2 3 , 4 5 ' 6 . 7 
Place a check on.the line next to the most 
appropriate explanation for the three decisions you just 
made: 
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1) My decision, whatever it may be, will lead to some 
goal for myself (i.e., praise, recognition, money, 
keeping my job, power over the system, promotion). 
(2) Sometimes providing information, not reporting extra 
income, paying money to get into markets is 
beneficial because it leads to more efficient 
organizations, greater disposable income, more 
competition, etc. 
(3) My decision is based on an evaluation made 
independently from rules as they relate to the 
|%\ I consequences of a specific act/decision; the 
maximization of pleasure greatly influences my 
decision process. 
(4) The wrong and rightness of my decision is in 
accordance with the conformity to a set of universal 
rules. I do not focus on consequences when 
determining wrong or rightness of my decision 
strategy. 
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   RISK SCENARIO 
Please read the following scenario carefully 
"What should we do?" 
John Johnson was not sure, but his brother and 
partner, Fred Johnson, was on the phone and needed a 
decision. Should they send the team ; of;consultants to, 
complete this re-organization project for the state 
government? It had been a successful year so far, but the 
government re-organization project was important because 
of the good press, future business, and money it 
promised. The first year had been hard because the team 
was trying to make a name for itself. They had completed 
a lot of small projects to,get this opportunity with a • 
big time government agency. A successful outing could 
mean more exposure for the organization, more business, 
and more money.. But if the team suffered another failure 
while the industry is watching... 
Just thinking about the team's problems made John 
wince. They had 7 failed projects in the last 24 outings 
this year with various degrees of damage to the 
organization's reputation. No one could figure out why. 
It took'a lot of money to repair the failed project 
attempts. John and Fred had everything they owned riding 
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on thQ■team's next big project- This one had to be a ' ' 
success.: 
; , ■ Paul Edwards the expert consultant was; guessing the . 
team's-'■prpblem- was. related to one member of the team not 
pulling his weight ., P.aul fel.f that' this particular ■ 
member's, performance was: the ■ culprit. for the team's 
decline in.'performance within the last year . ■ Paul : 
described 'how -.loa^f poor; consulting recommendations-
were the . real cau:s:e of:,the problem by this member. 
Tom Burns, the senior expert consultant, did not 
agreeIwith, Paul's "gut feeling" and had data to support 
his.; position. He pointed out that all members had made 
poor .consulting, recommendations at one time or another 
that meant it" couldn'/t be just one member . Tom had : 
consulted for over 20 years -and, believed that luck was an 
vimportant element of success. He had argued this view . 
when he and John discussed the problem last week: "In ;, 
consuiting, , you. are pushing the limits of what is known. 
You cannot expect to have:everything under control. If 
you want to be.the best, you have to take risks. 
Everybody in.consulting knows i.t . Ihave a career that 
.depends on the'- 'outcome of every pro ject. That' s the: 
thrill, beating the odds and.succeeding." Last night over 
" ii." '73. ■ ' 1 : ' ' . 
dinner,he had added to this argument forcefully with what 
he called Burns' First Law of Consulting: "Nobody ever . 
completed a project successfully by sitting on his/her 
butt." 
John, Fred and Tom had discussed,the team's up 
coming project situation the previous evening. The first 
year was a success from a consulting standpoint, with the 
team finishing 12 of 15 projects successfully. As a 
result, the business and acclaim that comes from the 
team's success rate were starting to come in. A big break 
had come 2 weeks ago after the Dunham project, where the 
team had ranked as one of the four top consulting teams 
in the industry. Gladstone industries had finally decided 
to hire Johnson Consulting for a smaller project worth a 
much needed $400,000. Additionally, Gladstone was 
considering using Johnson for a much larger consulting 
project worth roughly two million dollars over, the next 3 
years providing Johnson completed the government project 
successfully. Although internal experts at Gladstone 
recommended Johnson Consulting, the larger contract 
depended upon the government project outcome., 
"John, we only have another hour to decide," Fred, 
said over the telephone. "If we wait to do the project 
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for the government, we can keep the money acquired to do 
the initial assessment $15,000 and try to recoup some of 
our losses next year. We will lose Gladstone, they'll 
want $25,000 of their money back, and we end up the year 
$50,000 in the hole. If we take the project and finish 
successfully, we'll have Gladstone in our pocket and we 
can afford an additional consultant next year. You know 
as well as I do, however, that if we take the project and 
fail, we are back to square one next year. We will lose 
our reputation as one of the leading consulting firms in 
the industry, which in turn will lead to fewer contracts 
in the future. No organization wants to be associated 
with a consulting firm that has a failing record. Think 
about it—call Paul and Tom if you want—but I need a 
decision in an hour. 
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DECISION BEHAVIOR ADMINISTRATION" 
Please, read ,the. following additional information 
about the scenario and answer the question at the end. 
You are John Johnson. You must decide whether to , 
send' your consulting team in to complete the 
re-organization project .for the state government. You 
need'to make a decision within the hour knowing that 
there are certain risks involved. For example, if you 
engage your team, there may be some risks involved such 
as -business, personal, or financial risks associated with 
your decision. 
As John Johnson, you have had a moderate amount of 
training for and experience with this type of decision. 
Your previous decisions have been largely unsuccessful 
and , you have always had a nagging worry that your poor 
"track record" could eventually have serious 
consequences. You feel uncertain because of the lack of 
success of those decisions you have made in the past. 
What is the probability that you would engage the 
team/not engage the team (where 0% = definitely not 
engage team and 100% = definitely engage team )? . % 
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 RISK PERCEPTION 
Please answer the following four items about;the 
scenario: 
How would you characterize the decision faced by John 
Johnson? 
(1) 1 = significant opportunity to 7 = significant , 
. . ;threat : . ;i,i 
(2) 1 = potential for loss to ,7 =;potentiai:. for; ^^g 
(3) 1 = positive situation to 7 = negative situation 
What is the likelihood of the consuiting.team 
in the project? 
(4): I v= very unlikely to. 7 = very, likely 
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 , RISK PROPENSITY 
Please read the following,additional information 
about the scenario and answer these five questions: 
As John Johnson, you're faced with a decision that 
affects your organization's financial future. Given this 
circumstance, how', likely are you to... . CPlease answer by 
using "likely or unlikely" on the line provided under 
each number below; you will need to answer all five 
questions in this section, not just one of the five). 
(1) choose more or:less risky alternatives based on the 
"assessment of others- on; whom you must- rely 
(2) choose' more or'less risky alternatives, which rely 
upon analyses high in , t-'echnical cornplexit-y ': 
(3). 'choose more, or less risky alternatives which could 
have a major impact on the strategic.direction of 
your organization : "u 
(4) /initiate a strategic corporate action^ whiGh .has the 
potential to backfire - , . 
(5) support a decision when I was aware that relevant 
analyses were done while missing several pieces of-
information- , -i. . 
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MANIPULATION CHECK 
■Please read-and "answer the following questions about 
the previous scenario. 
1). Extent to which problems have resulted from John's 
i,decisions like this.in.the past 
.■ , , ;, ■ .Likely : V ; 1' lUnlikely , 
,:l 1^.;i- :2V' , "-.i ,4 5i' 1 :. -e ;- 7- ■ ; 
2) Degree toi.vih.ich John" has analyzed decisions like 
this correctly in ; the past 
" Likely. Unlikely ■ . "■ 
■ " : ' ■ 1^ : 2. - ' ' ■ 3 ■ : ; : A .5 ' 6; ■ ■7 b 
3) " : Degree to which successful outcomes have.resulted . : 
from John's.decisions like this in the past 
: i'" ^ Likely . ■ ■::, ■: ■ ■ ,^ " . . ,J Unlikely k 
: iV- 1 ' 2: 'i " ■ ■ .3- ' u; ■ 4 ■ . .h ■ ■ 6 " ' 7 ■ 
8 3 
APPENDIX I 
DECISION BEHAVIOR "2™ 
ADMINISTRATION" 
84 
;- ' DECISION BEHAVIOR:;"2®° ADMINISTRATION" . V 
: Now, please read the following additional , 
information about the scenario and answer the question: 
You are John Johnson. You must decide whether to 
send your consulting team in to complete the 
re-organizatlon project for the state government. You 
need to make, a:decision within the hour knowing that 
there are certain risks involved. For example, if you 
engage your team, there may:be some risks involved such 
as business, personal, or financial risks associated with 
your decision. 
As John Johnson, you have had a moderate amount of ' 
training for and experience with,this type of decision. 
Your previous decisions have, been largely successful and 
you have always derived a sense of self-assurance from 
your successful "track record" in making such decisions.. 
You feel ■confident because of the success of those' 
decisions- 'you . have made in the- past . " 
■iWhat islthe probability that you would engage the 
team/not-., engage : the team (where 0,% ■= detlnitely ' not • 
■engage team and' 100% = definitely engage team) '?" , .% 
• Please answer the following -four items about the 
scenario: . 
   
How would you charaeterize. the .decision faced by 
John Johnson? 
(1) 1 = significant opportunity to 7 = significant 
threat u- , 
(2) 1 = potential.for loss to 7 = potential for gain 
|3) 1 ■=. positive situation to 7 =■ negative;,-situation 
-What is, the likelihood, of the consulting team-
Succeeding in the,project? ■ 
(4) -1 = 'very' unlikely to 7,'= very; likely - - - -
please read the following :a.dditiona,-l information-
about. the scenario- and answer these - five; 'questions : 
, As John Johnson, . you're ■faced with a'decision, that; 
affects your organization' s financial:\fut-ure 'Given this 
circumstance, how likely are ;you to... (Please answer hy 
using "likely or unlikely" on the line provided under 
each number below; you will need to answer all five 
questions in this section, not just one of the five) 
(1) choose, more or less risky alternatives based, on the. 
assessment of others on whom,you must rely 
8 6 
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(2) choose more or less risky,alternatives, which rely 
upon analyses high in technical complexity 
(3) ' choose more or less- risky alternatives which could 
have a major impact on the strategic direction of 
your organization ^ . 
(4) . initiate a strategic corporate action which has the 
potential-to backfire' 
(-5) support,a decision when I was aware that relevant 
analyses were done while missing several pieces of 
information • 
Please read, and answer the following questions about 
the previous scenario. 
1) Extent to which problems have resulted from John's 
decisions like this in the past 
Likely Unlikely 
1 2 .3 . 4 5 6 7 
2) Degree to which John has analyzed decisions like 
this correctly in the past 
Likely Unlikely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3) . Degree to which successful outcomes have resulted 
from John's decisions like this in the past 
Likely Unlikely 
1 2 3 4. 5 6 7 
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